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Since the beginning of agricultural reform in the late 1970s and early 1980s, grain 
output  in  China  has  increased  significantly.  The  long-standing  problem  of  grain 
supply shortages has basically been solved. However, grain production and pricing is 
still  not  fully  liberalized  and  large  fluctuations  in  grain  prices,  together  with 
short-term shortages and surpluses of grain, have occurred several times. These events 
have seriously affected farmers’ incomes. Partially as a result, rural-urban income 
disparities have grown, particularly in the 1990s. 
In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization. Because of the commitment 
made  to  open  the  domestic  market  for  agricultural  products,  grain  imports  are 
increasing rapidly. Domestic grain production and farmers’ incomes are facing new 
challenges.  This  paper  examines  recent  developments  in  rural-urban  income 
differentials, especially in the light of the WTO commitments, the appropriateness of
related  domestic  policies  such  as  grain  pricing  and  urbanisation  policies,  and  the 
effects of adjustments of these policies in response to the new challenges. 
In  Section  1,  we  review  agricultural  production  and  rural-urban  income 
differences in China. Section 2 provides a brief outline of the likely impact of China’s 
WTO accession on the farming sector and rural incomes. In Section 3 we discuss the 
impact of policy inconsistency between the market opening and domestic trade policy. 
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In Section 4 we offer recommendations for further reform of the domestic grain trade 
system. Section 5 examines the potential contribution of rural industrialisation and
urbanisation to rural incomes and considers policies for acceleration of urbanisation in 
response to the situation of more open agricultural markets.
1. Agriculture and rural-urban income disparity in China
After  half  a  century  of  rapid  industrialisation,  the  dominant  role  of  China’s 
agricultural sector (including farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery) in the 
economy has been replaced by the industry and service sectors. In spite of significant 
growth in agricultural production, the share of the agricultural sector in GDP declined 
from 51 percent to only 15 percent from 1952 to 2001. However, because of the large 
size and continued growth of the rural population, the employment structure of the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors changed far more slowly than the change in 
the  output  structure.  Agricultural  employment  accounted  for 84  percent  of  total 
employment  in  1952,  and  declined  to  50  percent  in  2001.  At  the  same  time, 
agricultural employment increased from 173 million to 365 million.
1
The share of the rural population changed even more slowly. The rural population 
still accounts for 62 percent of China’s total population, as compared to 85 percent in 
1953 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: The importance of the agricultural and rural sectors in China
1952 2001 1952 2001
Agricultural
value-added Bil. Yuan 34 1461 % of GDP 51 15
Agr. worker mil. 
Persons 173 365 % of total 
employment 84 50
Rural population mil. 
Persons 505
* 796 % of total population 85 62
* 1953 data. 
Source: Calculated from National Bureau of Statistics (2002, 1999b).
Farming remains the most important component of Chinese agriculture; although 
reduced, it still accounted for 55% of the gross value of agricultural output in year 
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2001. Surveys show that, in year 2000, 51% of rural household income came from the 
agricultural sector as a whole and 39% from farming (Figure 1). Grain production has 
been the major farming activity, especially in less developed regions.
Figure 1: The structure of rural household income in year 2000
Source: NBS (2001).
Movement of the agricultural population to non-agricultural sectors was hampered 
by the restrictive central policies during the pre-reform period from the 1950s to the 
late 1970s. Rural industrialisation and urbanisation has been speeded up since the 
market reforms. Such developments have provided close to 200 million additional 
non-agricultural jobs to farmers in rural and urban areas over the past 24 years. Still,
the number of farmers has increased and there appears to be more surplus agricultural 
labour than ever before. Rural income grew slowly, and differences between rural and 
urban incomes became larger.   
Table 2 shows changes in income per capita in rural and urban areas of China and 
its three major regions from 1980 to 2000. It shows that rural income per capita in 
rural areas was 47 percent of urban income in 1980; this ratio had declined to 35 
percent by 2000. Rural-urban income disparity increased in all three regions, but more 
seriously in the least-developed West region where the rural-urban income ratio fell 












income per capita in the West region was 1713 Chinese Yuan (or US$ 207), only half 
of the average rural income in the East Region. 
Table  2:  Rural-urban  income  disparity,  1980  and  2000 (Chinese  Yuan  in  current 
prices)
1980 2000
Urban Rural Rural/urban Urban Rural Rural/urban
East 452 246 54.4% 7940 3429 43.2%
Central 386 191 49.5% 5217 2091 40.1%
West 383 172 44.9% 5642 1713 30.4%
China 413 193 46.7% 6635 2301 34.7%
Note: incomes are calculated by the authors as weighted averages from urban disposable income and 
rural pure income at the provincial level.
Source: NBS (2000a, 2001).
2. The impact of WTO accession on agriculture and rural incomes
In 2001, China entered the World Trade Organization and committed to open its 
domestic food markets to imports to a much larger extent. There have been several 
immediate  changes  in  agricultural  product  trade  policies  following  China’s  WTO 
accession. The most important ones can be summarised as follows:
a). China accepted a tariff rate quota (TRQ) for major grain imports (wheat, corn 
and rice) at a token tariff rate of 1%. The quota is 18.31 million tons for 2002, 20.2 
million tons for 2003, and 22.16 million tons for 2004 (WTO, 2001). The quota is 
shared between the state and private trading enterprises, and all unused state quotas 
are to be transferred to private enterprises. 
b). The above-quota tariff rate for the major grains is 65%.
2  There is no import 
quota for soybeans. The tariff rate for soybeans is 3%. 
c). The average tariff rate for all agricultural products is to be reduced from 22% 
to 17.5%.
d). All export subsidies are to be eliminated. 
e).  Other  non-tariff  restrictions  on  imports  of  agricultural  products,  such  as 
licensing, are to be eliminated. This includes restrictions on imports of wheat from the 
                                                       
2  However, this tariff rate is unlikely to be used in normal cases since the quota is large compared with the 
historical record of grain imports. 5
northwest areas of North America which may have TCK disease. 
The import quota of 22 million tons is large compared with the historical level of 
imports. During the 1990s, the average annual imports of grain were 9.0 million tons, 
and there were net export of 0.8 million tons annually. There was only one year, 1995, 
when grain imports exceeded 20 million tons, and this resulted in a serious surplus of 
grain on the domestic market. The 2004 import quota is equal to 5.5% of the total 
output in year 2000, a not very large proportion; however, the size of the domestic 
grain  market  is  far  smaller  than  total  output,  because  half  of  the  grain  output  is 
consumed by farmers and does not enter the market. Calculations show that the 2004 
TRQ  accounts  for  11.9%  of  the  domestic  grain  market.  It  is  estimated  that  full 
utilisation of TRQ in the short run, without major structural adjustment, could mean 
the loss of 9 million farming jobs (Wang, 2002).
China does not have a comparative advantage in the production of major grains 
such as wheat, corn and soybeans. A comparison shows that the average prices of 
these three products in rural markets in the period between 1995 and 2000 were 7%, 
30% and 31% higher than their 2000 CIF prices, respectively. It is not surprising, 
therefore,  that  imports  of  soybeans  and  soybean  oil  are  increasing  rapidly.  The 
domestic price of rice is lower than CIF prices, although its average quality is also 
lower  than  that  of  imports.  Thus,  in  the  face  of  increasing  imports,  domestic 
production of these grains will reduce significantly. 
In 2000 and 2001, cereal imports were at moderate levels of 3.15 and 3.44 million 
tons,  respectively.  Due  to  surpluses  and  the  low  prices  of  grain  in  the  domestic 
market,
4  as a result of the over-supply since 1998, it is unlikely that the TRQ will be 
fully used in the near future. However, the TRQ is preventing domestic grain prices 
from  recovering  to  their  recent  levels.  Meanwhile,  soybean  imports rose  to  the 
historically high level of 13.9 million tons in 2001, nearly as much as the domestic 
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output (NBS, 2002). This has led to a large surplus in the soybean market. 
It is clear that without major adjustments in the production structure, the growing 
grain  imports  will  significantly  affect  farmers’  incomes  and  further  widen  the 
rural-urban income gap.
However, the WTO accession provides great possibilities for reforming China’s 
agricultural  sector,  leading  to  positive  long-run  effects  on  farmers’  incomes,  as  it 
pushes  agriculture  towards  its  comparative  advantages  and  higher  efficiencies.  In 
2002, the area sown to grain in China fell by 2%, whereas the total grain output 
increased by 1% from the previous year. New breeds of soybean with significantly 
higher quality and higher oil content were introduced to Northeast China, the main 
region of soybean production (CCTV 08/01/2003). These are signs indicating that
further increases in efficiency in agricultural production are possible in response to 
the WTO challenge. 
However, to significantly increase agricultural efficiency and reduce rural-urban 
income disparities, not only structural adjustments of agricultural production but also 
broad changes in China’s domestic grain trade policy are needed.
3. The grain pricing system in China and its inconsistencies with WTO accession 
The current domestic grain trade policy—which provides grain support prices to
farmers and monopolises the domestic grain trade system (although, not fully)—is not 
only inconsistent with the trade liberalisation but is hardly helpful to farmers. 
Agricultural production and domestic trade of agricultural products was partially 
liberalised in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These reforms changed the long-term 
situation of grain supply shortages into surpluses. Grain output increased from 283 
million tons to 407 million tons during the 1978-84 period. Grain production was first 
stimulated  by  the  rise  in  state  purchasing  prices,  and  subsequently  fueled  by  the 
abolition  of  the  People’s  Commune  System  and  introduction  of  the  Household 
Responsibility System, which converted the collective-based production system into a 
private system. Grain production was affected by three prices at that time—the state 
quota  price,  the  above-quota  price,  and  the  market  price—but  none  of  them  was 7
linked to world market prices.
In nominal terms, quota prices rose slightly in the 1980s at a time of high inflation. 
From 1985 to 1990, the real price of the major grains (as a weighted average of the 
prices of rice, wheat and corn) fell by 22%. Market prices played a role at the margin, 
whereas  government  prices  had  a  larger  impact  on  grain  production  because  the 
volume  of  state  purchases  was  so  large  (Wang,  2001).  As  the  result  of  low 
government prices, grain output remained at the 400 million tons level in the middle 
and  late  1980s,  while  demand  for  grain  increased  significantly.  The  above-quota 
prices have converged to a level close to market prices since the early 1990s and 
fluctuated in line with market prices because of less government intervention. This 
seems to be the main reason for grain production reaching 440 million tons in the 
early and middle 1990s. 
Stimulated  by  the  improvement  in  grain  supply,  the  government  decided  to 
liberalise the quota control system in 1993. However, most of the state-owned grain 
dealers  have  become  partially  profit-oriented  and  expected  to  make  profits  from 
holding grain stocks. This resulted in supply shortages and sudden increases in market 
prices in the short run, which led farmers to hold their products for expected higher 
prices. Facing sharp increases in market prices and shortages, the government decided 
to give up the planned reform and, instead, to increase the quota prices substantially in 
1994. Quota prices were further increased in 1995-97 to encourage grain production. 
In 1997, the level of quota prices in real terms (as a weighted average of the prices of 
rice, wheat and corn) was 51% higher than in 1993 and 20% higher than in 1985 (data 
are from the Ministry of Agriculture, various years). Domestic prices of several grain 
products significantly exceeded the world market prices. At the same time, the central 
government introduced a “provincial governor responsibility system” to insure local 
self-sufficiency of grain supplies. 
Responding to the higher prices, the area sown to grain increased by 4% and grain 
yield  per  hectare  increased  by  10%  between  1994  and  1998.  Total  grain  output 
reached  504  million  tons  in  1996  and  512  million  tons  in  1998.  This output  far 
exceeded domestic demand and resulted in decreases in market prices since 1997. 8
From 1996 to 2000, market prices of rice, wheat, corn and soybean dropped by 
39%, 35%, 44% and 44%, respectively (calculated by the authors, data are from the 
Information Center, the Ministry of Agriculture). A model simulation shows that the 
rigid government pricing system has caused serious price and output instability in 
grain markets (Wang, 2001).
The rigidity of the state-monopolised grain trade system and mistakes of the grain 
trading  companies  added  fuel  to  the  flames  of  supply  surpluses.  While  domestic 
supply was increasing, there were net imports of 18.67 and 10.25 million tons of grain 
in  1995  and  1996,  respectively,  which  worsened  the  situation  of  domestic  grain 
surpluses. 
Faced with the low market prices, the government announced three policies in 
1998:  1)  all  grain  products  should  be  purchased  by  the  state  grain  companies  at 
support prices that are higher than market prices; 2) the state grain companies have to 
sell grain at prices not lower than the support prices, so that the state subsidy can be 
reduced; and 3) bank loans extended to these companies for the purpose of grain 
purchases are not allowed to be used for other purposes. In addition, in order to make 
the support prices work, the grain market was monopolised by the state, and private 
businesses were prohibited from purchasing grain directly from farmers. 
These policies did not achieve the goal of protecting farmers’ incomes for several 
reasons. First, after two decades of market-oriented reform, it is extremely difficult to 
entirely monopolise grain purchases. Second, the role of policy executants that was 
given to the state grain companies conflicted with their role as profit makers. To make 
profits or to avoid losses, they tended to under-grade the quality of grain they were 
purchasing from farmers, or make extra deductions for ‘wet’ and ‘impure’ grain, so 
that  they  could  pay  no  more  than  market  prices.  In  some  cases,  they  refused  to 
purchase from farmers, only from private dealers, so that under-the-table deals could
be  made  to  share  the  price  margin.  Third,  even  if  consumer  prices  could  be 
monopolised at a higher level than would clear the market, the demand for grain is not 
under state control. As the result, the over-supplied grain could not be sold off and the 
losses have to be borne  by either the state or farmers.  In addition, while farmers9
benefit little from the support prices, the state has to bear the huge cost of storing a 
large amount of grain and to invest in many new storehouses. 
Under these pressures, a few changes have been made to partially liberalise the 
grain markets. First, some low quality grains were excluded from the support list in 
2001. Second, up to 2002, the local grain market has been liberalised in eight east 
coast provinces that have  a grain trade deficit.  Third, decision-making on support 
prices has been transferred from the central to the provincial governments, and this 
has resulted in support prices moving closer to market prices. 
In spite of these changes, the support price system still conflicts with the market 
mechanism, and generates more conflict following the WTO accession, because it 
encourages  domestic  production  of  grain  which does  not  have  a  comparative 
advantage,  and  therefore  results  in  surpluses  and  lower  market  prices.  Further 
liberalisation of the grain market is needed. 
4. Policy considerations in liberalising the grain market
There are several fears about liberalisation of the grain market: 
1. Without government protection, farmers may be hurt when the market price of 
grain is low; 
2. Without the government purchase and supply of grain, food security may not be 
assured when there are poor harvests or war threats;
3. Liberalisation of the grain market and withdrawal of government subsidies will 
result in job losses in the state grain trade sector of up to two million; and
4. The accumulation of huge financial losses and non-performing loans in the state 
grain  sector  is  a  hot  political  potato;  once  the  market  is  liberalised,  the 
non-performing loans in the state sector have to be liquidated immediately.
Contrary to these opinions, past experience shows that government intervention 
has  resulted  in  instability  of  grain  supply,  larger  price  fluctuations,  inefficient
operations, and huge losses in the state grain trade sector. The earlier the state grain 
trade sector is reformed, the more quickly the losses can be avoided. 
In those provinces in which the grain market has been liberalised, the situation is 10
satisfactory: i.e., price levels, demand and supply are basically stable; the formal state 
grain companies have been either privatised or restructured; and at least some of these 
businesses have become profitable.
Liberalisation of the grain market will have at least the following benefits:
First, the grain surplus will soon be absorbed, which will help to stabilise market 
prices. Second, market prices formed on the basis of demand and supply will give 
farmers the best available information on which to base their production decisions. 
Other agricultural products in which China has comparative advantage, e.g., some 
vegetables, fruits, animal products, and herbal medicines, will replace grains, and this 
will  help  to  increase  farmers’ incomes.  Third,  the  accumulated  huge  losses  and 
non-performing loans in the state grain sector have become a heavy burden on the 
economy. This burden will be soon removed after liberalisation of the grain market.
However, as well as deregulation, the government needs to be pro-active in certain 
areas:
1. Anti-monopoly regulations should be enacted and a market supervision system 
established to reduce the likelihood of monopolistic practices, whether by government 
or private traders.
2.  Due  to  difficulties  in  farmers  gaining  access  to  market  information,  the 
government  should  accept  responsibility  for  establishing  a  broad  network  of 
information  services to  provide  farmers  with  supply  and  demand  information  and 
forecasts of the domestic and international food markets.   
3. In some areas, the agricultural technology support and training systems run by 
government have played an excellent role in helping farmers to adopt new technology. 
However, there are still many farmers, particularly in remote areas, who do not enjoy 
these services. These systems should be expanded. New products, breeds, fertilizers,
and other  technologies  and production  methods  should  be  more  widely  and more 
quickly introduced and demonstrated to farmers. 
4. For emergency food supply situations, an effective nation-wide grain reserve 
system is needed. However, its sole function should be as emergency food supplies.
Non-government stocks should be allowed to perform that role.    The current grain 11
reserve system is too large and too complicated and inefficient, run as it is by different 
government agencies at the central, provincial, and municipal levels. Because of the 
different interests of the various agencies and the conflicts within and between the 
agencies,  this  arrangement  can  hardly  serve  a  national  goal.  Given  a  shortage  of 
supply, some agencies may support the market using their reserves, while others may 
buy and hoard grains to make a profit. Therefore, it is necessary to reform the grain 
reserve  system  to give  it  a  single  objective  and  to  have  it  operate  under  clear 
guidelines and unified control. 
5. Relationship  between  rural  industrialisation  and  urbanisation  and  rural 
incomes
Grain market deregulation and structural adjustment in the agricultural sector are
important.    However, due to the huge surplus of agricultural labour (see section 1), 
these  measures  will  not  be  sufficient  to  absorb  the  shock  of agricultural 
internationalisation. Policy adjustments are also needed to accelerate China’s rural 
industrialisation and urbanisation.
During  the  economic  reform  period,  particularly  up  to  the  mid  1990s,  rural 
industry  developed  very  quickly  and  made  a  major  contribution  to  China’s  rapid 
economic  growth  (see  the  World  Bank,  1996,  Cai,  2000,  and  Wang,  2000). 
Employment in the Township and Village Enterprise (TVE) sector increased from 28 
million to 135 million during the period 1978-96, accounting for more than one-fourth 
of the total rural labour force. TVEs produce at least one-quarter of the total industrial 
output.  Development  of  the  TVE  sector  has  also  made  a  great  contribution  to 
increases in farmers’ incomes. Nearly one-half of rural household income now comes
from non-agricultural sources, mainly from the TVE sector. Figure 2 shows that the 
level of rural income per capita in China’s 31 provinces is closely associated with
provincial achievements in rural industrialisation. 12





























Note: Industrialisation is indicated by the share of TVE employment in rural labour. 
Rural income is per capita rural pure income (Yuan).
Source: Calculated from NBS (2000a, 2001). 
Rural  industries  experienced  substantial  development  in  the  1980s,  partially 
because  the  rural  reform  created  a  better  market  environment  while  the  urban 
economy was still heavily subject to central control. Government policies also had an 
important  influence,  encouraging  development  of  TVEs  in  rural  areas  and 
discouraging rural-urban migration. 
Development of rural industries slowed in the late 1990s, mainly due to sharper 
market  competition,  unfavourable  location  of  the  rural  enterprises,  difficulties  in 
external  finance,  and  lack  of  infrastructure  facilities,  technical  inputs,  and  human 
resources.  Meanwhile,  urbanisation  accelerated.  Large numbers  of  rural  labourers
migrated to urban areas to find jobs. In year 2001, the urbanisation rate (the ratio of 
urban to total population) in China reached 38%, whereas it was only 26% in 1990 
and 19% in 1980. Improvement in the availability of rural finance will certainly help
in  the  development  of  rural  industries.  Nevertheless,  the  importance  of  rural 
industrialisation in the economy is likely to be replaced by urbanisation.13
In spite of the acceleration in urban development, the rate of urbanisation in China 
is still 10-20 percentage points lower than the average of other countries at a similar 
income level (Wang and Xia, 1999). In particular, medium and large cities are in short 
supply  compared  with  China’s  large  population.  In  2000,  there  were  121  million 
people living in the cities of 0.5 million population and above, accounting for only 
9.6% of the national population. In the less-developed West region, people living in 
cities of these sizes only account for 5.6% of the region’s population.   If China had a 
similar urbanisation rate to the average of other countries at a similar income level, 
there  would  be  an  additional  120-240 million  people  living  in  urban  areas.  This 
number may also be thought of as the excess supply of people in the rural economy.
Figure 3 plots the urbanisation rate and rural income of China’s 31 provinces in 
year 2000. It indicates a positive relationship between urbanisation and rural income:
provinces  having  a  higher  urbanisation  rate  have  a  higher  rural  income.  This 
relationship may imply that urbanisation helps to liberate redundant rural labour from 
arable land and therefore increases agricultural productivity. Considering that one-half 
of  the  Chinese  labour  force  is  still  agricultural  labour,  urbanisation  could  have  a 
significant impact on agricultural productivity.
Figure 3: Relationship between urbanisation and rural income, year 2000
Symbols of provinces:
BJ:    Beijing TJ:    Tianjin HB:    Hebei SX:    Shanxi NM: Neimenggu14
LN:    Liaoning JL:    Jilin HLJ: Heilongjiang SH: Shanghai JS: Jiangsu
ZJ: Zhejiang AH: Anhui FJ: Fujian JX: Jiangxi SD: Shandong
HeN: Henan HuB: Hubei HuN: Hunan GD: Guangdong GX: Guangxi
HaN: Nainan CQ: Chongqing SC: Sichuan GZ: Quizhou YN: Yunnan
XZ: Xizang SnX: Shannxi GS: Gansu QH: Qinghai NX: Ningxia
XJ: Xinjiang
Note: The urbanisation rate used is the proportion of urban to total employment in each 
province.
Source: NBS (2001).
6. A causality test on the impact of urbanisation and policy considerations
However, this urbanisation effect does not have to be the only explanation for the 
relationship shown in Figure 3, because both urbanisation and higher rural income can 
be an outcome of economic growth. In the following, we introduce a growth model to 
test the causality between urbanisation and regional economic growth. This model has 
its origins in neoclassical growth models and endogenous growth models (see, e.g., 








where Yit, Kit, Hit Dit and Lit are growth rates of GDP, capital stock, human resources 
(indicated  by  workers’  average  year  of  schooling),  cultivated  land  area and  total 
employment, respectively, of the ith province in year t. Uit-1 is the urbanisation rate 
with a one-year lag (the urbanisation rate used is the ratio of urban employment to
provincial total employment). DUi(t-1) is the difference of Ui between years t-1 and t-2. 
ε is the error term. 
Lagged variables of U and DU are used for the causality test between urbanisation 
and  economic  growth.  This  specification  identifies  the  effect  of  urbanisation  on 
growth if U or DU is significant. The reason for including both U and DU in the 
model is to distinguish the possible growth effect (long-run effect) and level effect 
(short-run effect) of urbanisation. A significant estimate of U indicates a continuing
effect  of  urbanisation  on  growth  (meaning  urbanisation  bring  about  higher 
productivity growth), whereas a significant estimate of DU indicates an impact from
changes in the urbanisation rate on growth, which is a short-run effect. 
To impose the restriction of constant returns to scale (a
3=1-a
1-a
2), both sides of 15







where y, k, h and d are Y, K, H and D divided by L, respectively. 
To see the possible differences in the urbanisation effect at the different levels of 
economic development, Ui(t-1) is replaced by three urbanisation variables for the East, 
Central and West regions.  The East region is  the  most  developed while  the West 



















Panel data for 25 provinces and covering the 20 years from 1979 to 1998 have 
been used. The other six provinces were excluded due to incomplete data. Data were
provided by Fang Cai and Dewen Wang (2002) and from NBS (various years and 
1999b). Capital stock was calculated from the historical data for capital formation in 
each province.
Both Fixed Effects and Random Effects models were estimated. Hausman’s test 
rejects the hypothesis of the appropriateness of the Random Effects model, therefore 
the result of the Fixed Effects model is reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Modelling results: urbanisation and economic growth
Version  1’ Version  2

























Note:  t ratios  with  * and ** are significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. For  simplicity, 
coefficients of provincial dummy variables are not reported in this table.
Source: Estimation result. Original data are from NBS (2001, 1999b).16
The  two  versions  of  the  model  produce  similar  results.  Most  coefficients  are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. According to version (1’), the elasticities of 
capital, human resources, employment and land with respect to economic growth are 
0.348, 0.431, 0.205 and 0.016, respectively, all in reasonable ranges. The elasticity of 
land is minor and insignificant, which is not surprising because the farming sector 
only contributes a small proportion to the economy. The estimates of U are significant, 
which indicates that every one percentage point in the urbanisation rate accelerates 
provincial economic growth by 0.37 percentage points over the 7-10 percent high 
growth rate. DU is omitted from the model due to insignificant coefficient estimates
in previous regressions. These results suggest that urbanisation has a long-run impact
on economic growth. 
The major  difference  in  the results  of the  second  version of  the  model  is  the
insignificant effect of urbanisation on economic growth in the less-developed West 
region.  The  effect is  significant  in  the  two  other  regions.  There  are  two  possible 
reasons for this result: a) the effect in the West region is insignificant because the 
achievement of urbanisation in the West has been relatively low; or b) contrary to the
other regions, the urban economy in the West provinces has not experienced much 
restructuring, and is therefore less market-oriented and less efficient. 
In  general,  the  results  identify  a  contribution  from  urbanisation  to  economic 
growth via productivity changes. A reasonable explanation for the higher productivity 
growth is improvement in resource allocation between the rural and urban sectors. 
This  implies  that  accelerating  urbanisation  could  be  an  important  measure  to 
counteract the short-run side effects of WTO accession on the agricultural sector, and 
to reduce the rural-urban income gap.
Urbanisation  in  China  being  behind  other  countries is mainly  a  result  of  the 
previous central government policies restricting rural-urban migration and growth of 
large  cities.  Some  of  these  restrictions  have  been  removed  over  the  past  decade, 
however,  rural-urban  migration  is  still  partially  restricted  by  the  urban  household 
registration  system,  job  entry  barriers,  non-access  or  harder  access  to  health  care 
benefits and schooling, and public security protection, etc., against rural migrants. The 17
low  level,  or  lack,  of  rural  education,  job  training,  and  employment  information 
services are also barriers against rural-urban migration. Policy adjustments to remove 
these restrictions, to improve rural education, and to provide government services on 
job  training  and  employment  information  services  are  essential  for  accelerating 
urbanisation.
The  current  urban  economy  provides  limited  opportunity  for  rural  migrants 
because the number and size of cities is limited. Expansion of the urban economy will 
provide  employment  opportunities,  especially  in  China’s  under-developed  services
sector, which has a significantly higher proportion in the existing urban economy than
in the rural economy. It is the government’s responsibility to improve urban planning, 
urban  infrastructure,  public  utilities,  etc.,  in  order to  promote  urban  development. 
With these changes, many small cities and towns can be expected to become large or 
medium sized cities.   
6. Conclusion
The agricultural sector in China is seen as being labour-redundant, largely as the 
result of policies restricting the development of urban areas.    These policies are also 
seen as a major reason for China’s large and growing rural-urban income gap. The 
situation is worsening after the opening of China’s grain market resulting from its
WTO  accession.  In  particular,  the  over-regulated  domestic  grain  market  and 
government pricing conflicts with the new situation of openness, since these result in 
over  supply  of  grains.  It  is  suggested  that  the  domestic  grain  market  should  be 
liberalised and the grain pricing system should be deregulated. 
For further solutions to the import shock on the agricultural sector as the result of 
WTO accession, the roles of rural industrialisation and urbanisation are examined. We 
find that urbanisation has positive effects on rural incomes and regional economic 
growth.  Since  the  urbanisation  rate  in  China  is  significantly  lower  than  in  other 
countries at a similar level of GDP per capita, we recommend that urbanisation should
be  accelerated  by  deregulating  rural-urban  migration,  promotion  of  urban
infrastructure,  improvement  in  rural  education,  job  training  and  employment 18
information services.19
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